Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry — Edition Insights

(0 User reviews)   759
Balck, W. (William), 1859-1924, Krueger, Walter, 1881-1967 [Translator] Project Gutenberg 2021 Not confirmed
Military art and science; Tactics Readers of public-domain and historical texts
Project Gutenberg digital edition en

Edition facts

Words 180,696
Reading time 786 min
Text sections 43

For Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry — Edition Insights, the stored edition analysis reports 180,696 words, 13 hr 6 min estimated reading time, and 43 detected text sections.

The text analysis averages about 20.1 words per sentence, while the detected sections provide another way to judge how the source is divided.

Project Gutenberg metadata also associates the work with “Military art and science,” connecting these edition facts with the source record’s subject description.

A 1911 translation of Balck's German tactical manual, using Russo-Japanese and Franco-German war examples to discuss infantry skirmish formations, machine-gun countermeasures, and the friction between theory and field practice.
Share
Editorial Edition Score 4.9/5

Calculated from edition completeness, EPUB availability, text structure and catalogue metadata. Not a user rating.

How this score is calculated
  • Description quality20 pts
  • Title & short description10 pts
  • Source metadata20 pts
  • Text length15 pts
  • Chapters / structure15 pts
  • EPUB file integrity20 pts

Total of 100 points, scaled to a 2.5-5.0 range. Editions with an empty description or a missing EPUB file are not scored.

Edition quality

Read the Text

the states adopted the four company battalion, Russia being the last to do this (four line and one sharpshooter company). In the regulations of 1812, Prussia had adopted the four company battalion. The independent employment of the four united sharpshooter platoons of a battalion was the exception even during the campaign of 1866. At present only the British battalion consists of eight companies, which cannot, however, be said to possess a capacity for independent action on account of their small size.

In the four-company organization the battalion possesses an asset which enables it to adapt itself easily to any combat situation. The battalion organization is the outgrowth of practical necessity; the regimental commander cannot handle 12-16 companies without difficulty, and an intermediate unit, the battalion, is necessary. The battalion is the practical, and the regiment, consisting of 3 or 4 battalions, the ideal unit. Regiments consisting of two battalions do not possess the same advantages, as the regimental staff becomes superfluous during each necessary division of the regiment. Two battalion regiments do indeed facilitate command; they are, however, more expensive in time of peace and are of advantage in action only when formed into brigades of six battalions each, in which case the commander has a compactly organized reserve available.

“The regiment, by reason of its history, the uniformity of its training, the _esprit de corps_ of its officers, and its division into three battalions--thereby facilitating subdivision--is pre-eminently fitted for carrying out definite combat tasks.” (Par. 470 German I. D. R.). A glance at the map of the battle of Vionville (5B of the German General Staff work on the Franco-German war) shows that regiments, whenever they entered the field intact, fought as unbroken units throughout the battle, whereas brigade organizations were frequently broken up.

This breaking up of brigades is practically induced by the two regiment brigade organization. (Par. 471 German I. D. R.). When once the brigade commander has assigned sections or points of attack to his regiments, there remains very little for him to do. He can form a reserve only by taking two battalions from one regiment, or one battalion from each. The brigade is, however, not like the regiment, an entity of bodies of troops, but a unit assembled for tactical purposes, which may, without regard to the whole, be increased or diminished by one or more battalions in case of necessity. On the march and in action the brigade organization as a subdivision of the division cannot always be maintained; groups are frequently formed in which the normal units must be broken up. In large battles the brigade is the largest force which may yet be employed as an intact unit, although the employment of infantry by regiments will continue to be the rule. Brigade commanders are necessary for decreasing units of command and desirable for relieving the division commanders of a part of their work. In time of peace brigade commanders are useful for directing recruitment and, moreover, as connecting links between regiments and the division. The unmistakable advantages of the three-battalion organization have induced the United States to form its brigades of three regiments, each of three battalions (of 400 men each). An English division consists of three brigades of four battalions each.

4. INTRENCHING TOOL EQUIPMENT.[45]

[45] In the Russo-Japanese war the Russian companies were equipped with 80 small spades and 20 hand axes; the Japanese companies with 68 small spades, 17 mattocks, 8 hatchets, and 30 wire cutters.

Earth as a covering material and, incidental thereto, the adoption of the small spade after the Russo-Turkish war, have increased in importance owing to the greater penetrating power of the modern infantry bullets. The disadvantages of the spade lie in the danger of its being misused and in the consequent impairment of offensive spirit. There is, moreover, danger that the fire effect will be impaired and subordinated to considerations of cover. The spade should therefore not be employed on every occasion, but only when the tactical purpose in view requires it.

What the weight of the portable intrenching equipment of the Japanese, Russian, and British infantry will be, is still undecided, but experiments are being made with a uniform tool. When we consider, that for the purpose of intrenching, one man requires a space of 1.20 m., and for handling his rifle a space of 0.8 m., and that when intrenching under fire all the men cannot work, it is obvious that it would be impracticable to equip each man with an intrenching tool. According to all experience, it is sufficient to furnish every other man with spade or pick. In addition to this, however, a company requires a large number of wire cutters. Only the French infantry is equipped with explosives, every regiment having 108 cartridges.

The following table shows the intrenching tool equipment available in each battalion:

Balck’s Tactics, Volume 1 opens with a translator’s preface that situates the work as a practical textbook for U.S. Army officers, commissioned at the Army Service Schools. The author’s own preface, written for the fourth German edition, candidly acknowledges that the Boer war “confused the views on infantry combat” while the Russo-Japanese war “corroborated the soundness” of earlier lessons. This tension—between negative and positive evidence—shapes the entire volume, which is less a fixed doctrine than a comparative analysis of how different armies apply enduring principles under evolving firepower.

Evidence from Two Wars

The preface reveals a deliberate method: Balck waited years before publishing this edition, preferring “practical experience by service with troops” over “pure theoretical reflection.” He drew on communications from foreign officers after the Russo-Japanese war, yet he also warns that theoretical work “is only too apt to depart from the requirements of practice.” The excerpts show how this caution plays out in concrete tactical advice. For instance, the section on machine guns cites Swiss doctrine stating that “one platoon of infantry will suffice for silencing one machine gun” at medium ranges, but then immediately qualifies this with the observation that “even skirmish lines cannot continue their advance over terrain devoid of cover” when exposed to unsubdued machine-gun fire within 1500 meters. The text repeatedly balances general rules against specific conditions.

Formations Under Fire

A striking passage details the vulnerability of different formations to machine-gun fire. The author reports that a column of platoons lying down sustained “4.22% hits at 1400 m. and 4.31% hits at 900-1100 m.” within one minute, with 32 to 42 percent of those hit “placed out of action.” The recommended response is not to rise but to “crawl forward into line,” because standing would mean “annihilation.” This level of quantitative specificity—including exact ranges, hit percentages, and time intervals—is characteristic of the work’s approach. The text also advises that infantry skirmishers should “conceal themselves so well that it will be difficult for the hostile machine gun battery to find them,” taking into account “color of immediate vicinity (shade) and background.”

The Translator’s Role

Walter Krueger, then a first lieutenant and instructor at the Army Service Schools, translated the fourth German edition. His preface notes that the translation was undertaken “at the instance of Major John F. Morrison, General Staff,” for use in the tactics course. Krueger describes the book as “an epitome of the interpretation and application of tactical principles in the various armies,” discussed through the lens of German views and “amplified by numerous examples from military history.” The translator’s own position—as an active-duty officer teaching at Fort Leavenworth—reinforces the volume’s intended audience: regular and militia officers seeking “a working knowledge of tactics.” The text thus functions as a bridge between European military theory and American professional education in the early 20th century.

Readers should approach this volume as a period document that records how military professionals processed the firepower revolutions of the early 1900s. The excerpts show a work that is neither a simple drill manual nor a theoretical treatise, but a hybrid: it uses historical examples, foreign doctrine, and quantified test data to derive practical guidelines. Pay attention to the footnotes, which often contain the most specific tactical observations, and to the way Balck qualifies his own recommendations with conditional language.

Balck’s old manual, with its careful diagrams of skirmish lines, always reminds me of a quiet arithmetic of risk. It shares a kinship with Some Principles of Frontier Mountain Warfare — Themes and Context, for both speak of ground that refuses to obey theory, demanding a soldier’s patience and a steadfast heart.

There are no reviews for this eBook.

0
0 out of 5 (0 User reviews )

Add a Review

Your Rating *
There are no comments for this eBook.

Reader reflection

What did you think of this book?

Answer a few questions and save a private reflection on this device.

Your progress 0 / 10
1

Have you finished this book?

2

Was reading this book enjoyable?

3

How likely are you to recommend this book?

4

How easy was the book to follow?

Related eBooks