Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry — Edition Insights

Evidence from Two Wars

The preface reveals a deliberate method: Balck waited years before publishing this edition, preferring “practical experience by service with troops” over “pure theoretical reflection.” He drew on communications from foreign officers after the Russo-Japanese war, yet he also warns that theoretical work “is only too apt to depart from the requirements of practice.” The excerpts show how this caution plays out in concrete tactical advice. For instance, the section on machine guns cites Swiss doctrine stating that “one platoon of infantry will suffice for silencing one machine gun” at medium ranges, but then immediately qualifies this with the observation that “even skirmish lines cannot continue their advance over terrain devoid of cover” when exposed to unsubdued machine-gun fire within 1500 meters. The text repeatedly balances general rules against specific conditions.

Formations Under Fire

A striking passage details the vulnerability of different formations to machine-gun fire. The author reports that a column of platoons lying down sustained “4.22% hits at 1400 m. and 4.31% hits at 900-1100 m.” within one minute, with 32 to 42 percent of those hit “placed out of action.” The recommended response is not to rise but to “crawl forward into line,” because standing would mean “annihilation.” This level of quantitative specificity—including exact ranges, hit percentages, and time intervals—is characteristic of the work’s approach. The text also advises that infantry skirmishers should “conceal themselves so well that it will be difficult for the hostile machine gun battery to find them,” taking into account “color of immediate vicinity (shade) and background.”

The Translator’s Role

Walter Krueger, then a first lieutenant and instructor at the Army Service Schools, translated the fourth German edition. His preface notes that the translation was undertaken “at the instance of Major John F. Morrison, General Staff,” for use in the tactics course. Krueger describes the book as “an epitome of the interpretation and application of tactical principles in the various armies,” discussed through the lens of German views and “amplified by numerous examples from military history.” The translator’s own position—as an active-duty officer teaching at Fort Leavenworth—reinforces the volume’s intended audience: regular and militia officers seeking “a working knowledge of tactics.” The text thus functions as a bridge between European military theory and American professional education in the early 20th century.

Readers should approach this volume as a period document that records how military professionals processed the firepower revolutions of the early 1900s. The excerpts show a work that is neither a simple drill manual nor a theoretical treatise, but a hybrid: it uses historical examples, foreign doctrine, and quantified test data to derive practical guidelines. Pay attention to the footnotes, which often contain the most specific tactical observations, and to the way Balck qualifies his own recommendations with conditional language.

Balck’s old manual, with its careful diagrams of skirmish lines, always reminds me of a quiet arithmetic of risk. It shares a kinship with Some Principles of Frontier Mountain Warfare — Themes and Context, for both speak of ground that refuses to obey theory, demanding a soldier’s patience and a steadfast heart.