The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte. Vol. 3 (of 4) — Context and Discussion
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Russians were dislodged from Warsaw, and Thorn was besieged; the Vistula, Bug, Wkra, Narew, and other rivers were bridged; and a commissary department was organized. The seat of war was different indeed from any of those to which Napoleon had hitherto been accustomed. It was neither as densely settled nor as well tilled as Italy and Germany, the population was far lower in the scale of civilization, and therefore fiercer. The inhabitants could easily strip their villages of the little forage and the few goods they possessed, and at that season the fields were bare. The roads were of the worst description; the rivers were deep and broad, often with swampy banks and treacherous bottoms. In these circumstances it was almost impossible to secure reliable information, for scouts and spies were alike at fault.
These new conditions of warfare were further complicated by a change in the character of Napoleon's army. After Austerlitz many men of German speech were to be found among the rank and file, and after Jena the character of the soldiery grew more and more cosmopolitan. On the first appearance of the imperial eagles of France in Poland, Jerome was at the head of a whole corps of Wuertembergers and Bavarians; many Poles, Italians, Swiss, and Dutch were in others of the French corps; and among the foreigners there were even Prussians from beyond the Elbe. Some confusion was caused by this, and it was not diminished by the fact that the French themselves had scarcely recovered from the orgies in which they had been indulging for the last six weeks. Moreover, the determination of the Emperor to "conquer the sea by land" had emphasized in his mind the necessity of an overwhelming superiority of numbers, and in November he demanded from the French senate the eighty thousand conscripts who, according to law, could not be drawn until September, 1807. This was the beginning of the fatal practice destined in the end to enervate France and demoralize the army. There was already little patriotism among the men, except what served as a pretext for plunder; the homogeneity of purpose, principle, nationality, and age was soon to disappear.
In the preliminary operations this deterioration was not apparent. The troops marched doggedly through the mud, worked hard when called upon, and although their rations, which were supplied by rascally contractors, were very bad and altogether different from those to which they had become accustomed in the years just preceding, the men ate them without murmuring. But when, on December twenty-sixth, they joined battle, the old push and nerve seemed lacking. The preparations had been made on the plan of concentration, but at the last moment Lannes was detached with his division to cut off the enemy's line of retreat over the Narew. Napoleon, as at Jena, believed the main army of his opponent to be where it was not, and he was incautious in thus dividing and weakening his forces. Accordingly the battle had an irregular and indecisive character. Lannes came unexpectedly upon the mass of the Russian army, two columns forming the center and right, and engaged them from ten in the morning until two in the afternoon. At that hour a reserve arrived under Gudin, and attacked the Russian right. But Bennigsen, the commander of that column, had ready a fresh reserve, and with its aid the newcomers were repulsed. Lannes, who had simultaneously made a final onset, was also beaten off by the superior force of his enemy. On the same day, Murat, Davout, and Augereau reached the neighboring village of Golymin, expecting to find the Russian center there; on the left wing, at Neidenburg, Ney stood face to face with Lestocq and his Prussians. There was nothing but skirmishing at either place, for the French emperor could not drag his artillery through the mud swiftly enough to make it tell at the right time, and both Prussians and Russians drew slowly off. Soult was to have repeated the turning manoeuver as carried out before Jena, but the marching was so difficult, owing to a thaw, that he could not accomplish anything like the necessary distance.
Sloane's third volume opens with Napoleon's campaign against Russia in 1806-07, immediately establishing a tension between military conquest and political strategy. The author notes that Napoleon's dealings with Poland were driven by 'strategy' rather than settled policy, as he 'never conquered either Russia or Poland.' This pattern of incomplete domination recurs throughout the volume, from the indecisive victory at Friedland to the failed Spanish campaign. Sloane's narrative emphasizes the logistical and human costs of war, such as the 'homesickness of the French' and the 'discontent in the Grand Army,' while also detailing the tactical decisions that shaped battles.
Tactical Detail and the Fog of War
Sloane provides granular descriptions of battlefields, such as the 'low meadows' near Aspern and the 'stone barns with walls many feet thick' that became focal points of combat. At Aspern, the fighting is described as 'awful,' with the churchyard and a barn serving as contested strongpoints. The author notes the fragility of Napoleon's bridge over the Danube, which gave way under 'masses of rubbish' from a freshet, a detail that underscores how environmental factors could undo careful planning. Sloane also records Napoleon's overconfidence before the battle, which 'disappeared at once' when the Austrians appeared in force. These passages ground the narrative in concrete, observable phenomena rather than abstract strategy.
Napoleon's Generals and the Human Element
The volume frequently highlights the roles of subordinate commanders like Masséna, Lannes, and Bessières, whose actions are woven into the tactical narrative. Sloane notes that Napoleon's orders were sometimes ambiguous—Pelet's memoirs claim the Emperor simply ordered troops to 'cross the river and march against the enemy.' The author also points to the 'weakness of the Russians' and the 'ability of Bennigsen' as factors in the campaign, avoiding simple hero-villain dichotomies. The 'discontent in the Grand Army' and 'homesickness of the French' are mentioned as internal pressures, suggesting that morale was a persistent concern. These observations keep the focus on the human scale of warfare.
The Unfinished Continental System
Sloane frames Napoleon's Russian campaign as part of a larger 'continental system' aimed at isolating Britain. The author writes that the struggle was 'not for Russian abasement but for Russian friendship' in service of this system. Yet the volume repeatedly shows the system's incompleteness: the Spanish campaign fails, Austria transforms and re-enters the war, and tensions with the Czar escalate. The 'Tilsit' chapters depict a temporary alliance that later unravels. Sloane's narrative thus presents the continental system as a driving but ultimately unattainable goal, with each battle and treaty revealing new fractures. The reader is left to observe how Napoleon's strategic vision collides with the realities of European politics.
Readers of this volume will find a military history that resists simple narratives of triumph or decline. Sloane's attention to the physical details of battlefields, the decisions of commanders, and the political context invites careful comparison between Napoleon's stated aims and the outcomes on the ground. The excerpts suggest a work more concerned with documenting complexity than with celebrating or condemning its subject.
That rainy afternoon, I lingered over Napoleon’s grim triumph at Eylau, the mud and patience of it all. The sheer stubbornness of command stayed with me. Later, browsing the shelves, I found myself pulled toward a different kind of struggle, equally relentless, fought on shifting seas. Sea-Wolves of the Mediterranean: The grand period of the Moslem corsairs — Reading Notes felt like a quiet, salt-stained echo of that same desperate persistence.
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